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TRANSFER PRICING: 
ACHIEVING FAIR NATIONAL 
TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
TRANSACTIONS* 
L INTRODUCTION 
PAMELA L. KAYFETZ" & 
LEO B. HELZEL'" 
Currently, taxation is based on the sovereignty of nations, 
whereby each nation taxes income derived from businesses 
within its sovereign control. International issues are ad-
dressed, to some extent, through a number of bilateral treaties, 
many based on an international model or convention,l mutual 
understandings, and practice. Taxation of international trans-
actions by individual nations often results in confusion, dis-
agreement, multiple taxation of the same income,2 and, of 
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of California School of Law (Boalt Hall). Professor, Haas Graduate School of Busi-
ness, University of California (Berkeley) (1968-present); M.B.A. 1968, University of 
California (Berkeley); Certified Public Accountant, California and New York. 
1. See, e.g., Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, (OECD Sept. 1, 
1995). The work and development of this have involved a number of countries, 
which refer to this model in the settlement of disagreements. The United States 
and Japan have both been very involved with the development and evolution of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [hereinafter OECD] 
work on tax and transfer pricing. 
2. For a discussion of the current situation as perceived by large multination-
al corporations, see Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing: Risk Reduction and Advance 
Pricing Agreements, (Ernst & Young International Ltd. 1995) reprinted in 11 TAX 
NOTES INT'L 293 (July 31, 1995) [hereinafter Ernst & Young, Transfer PricingJ. 
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course, taxable income which is not taxed by any nation. Con-
currently, the fragmentation of taxation of international trans-
actions into a number of national systems provides a signifi-
cant opportunity to business entities for tax avoidance, eva-
sion, or mistake.3 
Transfer pricing, the price charged by one business entity 
to another for the provision of goods, services, or intangibles,' 
constitutes the easiest way for reallocating income and expens-
es between entities.5 As part of their tax planning, many com-
panies ·avail themselves of tax savings to be had by locating 
their services, production, or other facilities in regions with 
more favorable tax systems.6 Companies also structure them-
selves in order to minimize worldwide taxation. 7 The line be-
tween tax planning and tax abuse is crossed when and if enti-
ties misuse transfer pricing.s This occurs when the pricing of 
3. See Charles F. Connolly, Comment, The New Transfer Pricing and Penalty 
Regulations: Increased Compliance, Increased Burdens, and the Search for a Safe 
Harbor, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 339, 340 (1995). 
4. TAX POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION ISSUES, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
REPORT ON TRANSFER PRICING AND TAX COMPLIANCE OF FOREIGN AND U.S.-CON-
TROLLED CORPORATIONS 1 (Apr. 13, 1995), reprinted in Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 
92 at L-1 (May 12, 1995) [hereinafter TAX POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION ISSUES]. 
5. See Susan C. Borkowski, Advance Pricing (Dis)Agreements: Differences in 
Tax Authority and Transnational Corporation Opinions, 22 INT'L TAX J. 23 (1996). 
6. For a discussion of this form of planning, "tax arbitrage," as an opportuni-
ty created by the nation-state taxing multinational businesses, see Walter F. 
O'Connor, Editor's Note, 22 INT'L TAX J. iii, iv (1996) (including examples such as 
hybrid company structures, cross-border leasing and licensing, and structuring 
products to gain different treatment in different states). For a brief review of an 
international meeting of tax lawyers discussing, contrasting, and developing models 
of transactions designed to benefit from international tax arbitrage, see Internation-
al Financial Transactions, 12 TAX NOTES INT'L 1589 (May 20, 1996). 
7. These structures are numerous and are often hybrid in order to fit under 
one country's definition of a particular structure while avoiding that of another or 
taking advantage of particular structurally-based tax advantages. An example of 
this is the commissionaire distribution structure wherein the local distribution 
subsidiary does not buy and resell goods, but sells goods in its own name on be-
half of the foreign supplier as an undisclosed principal. The primary transfer pric-
ing issue in this structure is the appropriateness of the commission paid the 
commissionaire, which is much simpler to compare and justify, leaving much more 
flexibility as to pricing strategies. See Martin R. McClintock & Stephen A. Ward, 
International Tax and Business Planning Opportunities Through Commissionaire 
Arrangements, 22 INT'L TAX J. 55 (1996) (describing the commissionaire structure, 
its objectives, advantages, and disadvantages). 
8. The following is an example of potential tax problems arising from im-
proper transfer pricing between two fictitious, related companies. NipponSoft Multi-
national, headquartered in Osaka, Japan, develops and sells its patented and copy-
2
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goods, services, intangibles, or other elements is artificially 
increased or decreased in order to shift income and/or expenses 
between entities for tax reasons.9 The difficulties inherent in 
the taxation of income shifted through transfer pricing are 
receiving increased attention at both the national and interna-
tional levels,lO and constitute the most significant tax issue 
for multinational corporations today.ll 
This article will examine the significance of transfer pric-
ing. Further, it will review, as an example, the current nation-
al and international systems and procedures for identifying 
and capturing tax lost due to inaccurate transfer pricing used 
by two countries: the United States, as the originator and 
developer of much of the transfer pricing methodology, and 
Japan, one of the countries most actively involved in the regu-
lation of transfer pricing and also a major trading partner of 
righted software in Japan and worldwide. Transfer pricing to unrelated distribu-
tors provides NipponSoft with a gross profit of 67%. NipponSoft, U.S.A., a fully-
owned subsidiary located in San Jose, California, sells and services its parent's 
software exclusively in the U.S .. Intercompany pricing is cost plus 20% profit. This 
subsidiary's net profits in 1996 exceeded the parent's company's unconsolidated 
earnings. Assume that the Japanese corporate tax rate is higher than the compa-
rable U.S. rate. 
9. See TAX POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION ISSUES, supra note 4. The definition 
of abusive transfer pricing practice used in United States tax treaties describes 
the practice as it would differ from pricing between unrelated parties: 
Where a resident of a Contracting State and any other 
person are related and where such related persons make 
arrangements or impose conditions between themselves 
which are different from those which would be made 
between independent persons, then any income, deduc-
tions, credits, or allowances which would, but for those 
arrangements or conditions, have been taken int!l account 
in computing the income (or loss) of, or the tax payable 
by, one of such persons, may be allocated and utilized in 
computing the amount of the income subject to tax and 
the taxes payable by such resident of that Contracting 
State. 
Convention between the United States of America and Japan for the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion Respect to Taxes on Income, 
Mar. 8, 1971, U.S."Japan, art. 11, para. 1, U.S.T. 969, 1004 (1972) [hereinafter 
U.S.-Japan Tax Treaty]. 
10. See, e.g., Announcement 95-2, 1995-2, I.R.B. 59 (transfer pricing as main 
focus of IRS international examination activity and innovative methods for increas-
ing voluntary compliance) [hereinafter Announcement 95-21. 
11. See Ernst & Young LLP, Ernst & Young 1995 Transfer Pricing Documenta-
tion Survey, (Ernst & Young International Ltd. 1996), reprinted in 13 TAX NOTES 
INT'L 204 (July 15, 1996); see also Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing, supra note 2. 
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the United States. It will include a brief analysis of current 
issues and possible solutions to transfer pricing. 
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TRANSFER PRICING 
ISSUE 
Business, for better or for worse, comprises the most po-
tent force for change in the world today. The impact of busi-
ness is felt, not only economically, but also in the realms of 
science, education, politics, social mores, and culture, as well 
as within almost every other realm of our global society. Busi-
ness has become the lifeblood and the changing force in the 
world and the patterns and dynamics of business drive devel-
opment in all realms of daily life. 
As the world economy is currently structured, potential tax 
consequences are a major factor in most business decisions, 
often the deciding factor. Tax policy also comprises a potent 
force in politics, economics, and environmental management, 
both within and between nations. Governments, politicians, 
business entities, lobbyists, and numerous others aspire to and 
succeed in shaping tax policy in order to support their particu-
lar goals. Nations use tax policy not only to raise revenues, but 
also to encourage and enforce national goals, ambitions, poli-
cies, and priorities. Many governments are creating incentives 
and placing pressures on firms and industries to international-
ize. I2 For example, in order to develop self-sufficiency or a 
stronger economic base, many countries offer incentives to 
businesses to position parts of their manufacturing or services 
in specific countries and regions. I3 
Although taxation can serve in the achievement of politi-
cal, developmental, and environmental goals, among others, 
the basic purpose of taxation is to generate revenue to contrib-
ute to the costs of maintaining the state. Traditionally, taxa-
tion has been based on a theory of territoriality, taxing income 
12. See Peter F. Cowhey & Jonathan D. Aronson, A New Trade Order, 72 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 183 (1993). 
13. See Jeffrey E. Garten, Is America Abandoning Multilateral Trade?, 74 FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS 50, 57-58 (1995) (discussing increasing U.S. and other nations' ex-
panding government support for firms). 
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in the territory in which it is earned by the governing state's 
tax administration. 
Increasingly, the geographic OrIgm of income is not only 
difficult or impossible to determine, but also it is no longer 
necessarily a valid basis for taxation. 14 Even in cases where it 
makes sense to levy tax based on the nation or territory where 
the income is earned, this demarcation becomes very difficult 
to ascertain when several locations are involved in the income 
generating process or product. Businesses are becoming in-
creasingly integrated in order to achieve economies of scale, 
profit and product diversification, market penetration, comple-
mentary product production, and other business goalS. 15 This 
integration takes place vertically 16 and horizontally as well as 
through formal and informal alliances inside and outside of 
specific industries and geographically, both domestically and 
internationally. 17 Transnational corporations extend beyond 
national borders, are subject to the laws of more than one 
nation, and are increasingly recognized as international enti-
ties requiring not only international legal regulation, but also 
possible recognition as international legal persons. 18 
Technological advances enable some enterprises to conduct 
business multinationally without leaving the home office or 
14. For a specific example, see Andrew M. Snyder, Note, Taxation of Global 
Trading Operations: Use of Advance Pricing Agreements and Profit·Split Methodol· 
ogy, 48 TAX LAw. 1057 (1995). 
15. See, e.g., Cowhey & Aronson, supra note 11 (asserting that, despite govern-
ment intervention, the world market is more thoroughly integrated than 20 years 
ago, and using the automobile industry as a specific example). 
16. For an explanation of how - due to the nature of their transactions verti-
cally integrated multinationals differ so greatly in their functions, contractual 
terms, risks, markets, and products for the uncontrolled transactions (that the 
Regulations require to be used as a basis to determine an arm's length price) -
that it is unlikely that other transactions could be adjusted to be presented to the 
Service as sufficiently comparable transactions to justify the taxpayer's pricing, see 
Henry J. Birnkrant & James E. Croker, Jr., Transfer Pricing Final Regs. Increase 
Flexibility, But Not Certainty in Choice of Method, 81 J. TAX'N 268, 273 (1994). 
17. For clear analysis and explanation of the semiconductor industry, computer 
industry, automobile industry, and telecommunications services as examples of this 
new economic order, see Cowhey & Aronson, supra note 11, at 185-191. 
18. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAw 171-172 (3d ed. 1995) (dis-
cussing the increased attention and practice in international law regarding the 
rights and duties of transnational corporations and the possibility that the latter 
could thereby be regarded as international persons). 
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sometimes even the home. 19 The growth of technology; partic-
ularly communication, is making the world a smaller place at 
an incredibly quick pace. With the rapid development of the 
Internet, the location of a given sale or service becomes diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to place.20 It is increasingly hard to 
determine where something is produced, designed, created, 
adjusted, or somehow had value added.21 
As a greater proportion of taxable business income is de-
rived from transactions which are international in nature, the 
significance and impact of the systems and procedures for this 
taxation evolve.22 The appropriate taxation of international 
business transactions, by its definition and nature, requires 
comprehension of the international systems within which the 
transactions occur. The direction applied to international busi-
ness by taxation impacts the development, stability, and health 
of the world economy in profound and fundamental ways, due 
not only to fluctuations in tax revenues, but also to the myriad 
other effects of tax policy. 
The tax authorities of a number of nations, including the 
United States, are increasing their review of transfer pricing 
practices ,23 particularly internationally within and between 
19. For an industry-specific discussion of global trading operations and the 
difficulty of associating each business transaction with exact geographical locations 
for transfer pricing purposes, see Snyder, supra note 13. (Global trading operations 
are an excellent example of an industry which is not based on geographic location 
of the taxpayer or transaction and therefore is extremely vulnerable to double 
taxation, but not fitting well within the paradigms of transfer pricing regulations.) 
20. O'Connor, supra note 6, at v. 
21. See Jeffrey E. Garten, American Trade Law in a Changing World Econo-
my, 29 INT'L LAw. 15, 22 (1995); see also O'Connor, supra note 6, at iv. For a 
description of the issues the Treasury Department is currently studying for its 
forthcoming paper on how to tax electronic commerce, acknowledging that it does 
not fit within the current parameters for transfer pricing regulation, such as per-
manent establishments, see Treasury Paper Will Examine § 482 Issues Affecting 
Electronic Online Transactions, Transfer Pricing (BNA) at 109 (July 3, 1996) (quot-
ing Bruce Cohen, attorney adviser in U.S. Treasury's International Tax Counsel's 
office: "Could a computer server be a permanent establishment? Are there any 
circumstances under which a [World Wide Web] page that takes orders [could] be 
a permanent establishment?") 
22. See Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing, supra note 2, at 293-294 (describing 
the current systems and procedures as comprising a "global tax war" with the 
U.S. having made "the declaration of war"); cf Garten, supra note 12 (discussing 
in this article the importance and definition of the right kind of multilateralism). 
23. See, e.g., Prepared Remarks by Commissioner of Internal Revenue Margaret 
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multinational corporations. This heightened scrutiny is not 
surprising since it is estimated that nearly half of all trade 
among advanced nations takes place between related par-
ties.24 The amount of potential tax revenue involved in inaccu-
rate transfer pricing is large25 and increasing,26 and leads to 
the likely conclusion that national tax authorities' efforts to 
pursue that revenue will also continue to increase.27 
Milner Richardson at Institute on Current Issues in International Tax, Dec. 14, 
1995, 241 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) at L-4, L-5 (Apr. 30, 1996). [hereinafter Prepared 
Remarks by Commissioner] (reaffirming the Service's commitment to transfer pric-
ing and base erosion as the first of five areas in its international compliance plan 
and discussing progress); see also Study Shows Authorities Aggressively Questioning 
Practices of Multinationals, 137 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) at G-2 (July 18, 1995) (cit-
ing a survey of 210 multinational corporations based in the U.S., U.K, Australia, 
France, Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands); Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing, 
supra note 2, at 295 (stating that the activities most susceptible to transfer pric-
ing disputes are: charges for administrative or managerial services, royalties for 
intangible rights, and transfers of finished goods for resale). 
24. Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing, supra note 2. 
25. See Study Says Pricing Abuse Cost $33 Billion in Lost Revenue in 1993, 2 
TRANSFER PRICING (BNA) at 788 (1994) (study indicating that transfer pricing 
abuses cost the U.S. $33 billion in tax revenue in 1993). Transfer pricing has been 
the basis for approximately 75% of I.R.S. adjustments to multinational 
corporations' income in recent years. See Marc M. Levey et aI., Transfer Pricing: 
Alternative Practical Strategies, 890 T.M. § 7:1 (1996) [hereinafter Levey et aI., 
Transfer Pricing]. 
26. See, e.g., Unagreed Transfer Pricing Adjustments Totaled $911 Million FY 
1995, IRS Says, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 19 at G-2 (Jan. 30, 1996) ("IRS ... 
reported that taxpayers agreed to $727 million in transfer pricing adjustments 
during fiscal 1995, compared to $566 million in fiscal 1994. This represents a 28 
percent increase over the previous fiscal year. Total Section 482 adjustments in 
large cases totaled $1.64 billion in fiscal 1995, compared to $1.2 billion in fiscal 
1994 - a 39% increase over fiscal 1994 .... n) [hereinafter Unagreed Transfer Pric-
ing Adjustments). 
27. See, e.g., Prepared Remarks by Commissioner, supra note 22, at L-5; see 
also Survey of Multinational Companies Finds Majority Subject to Transfer Pricing 
Inquiries, Transfer Pricing (BNA) at 163 (July 19, 1995) (quoting Michael Patton, 
chairman of Ernst & Young's International Transfer Pricing Task Force: "In the 
midst of the current global investment boom, national revenue authorities are 
scrutinizing transfer pricing practices more closely, introducing added uncertainties 
and risks into investment planning."). 
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III. CURRENT SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES FOR HAN-
DLING TRANSFER PRICING ISSUES 
A. BACKGROUND 
The body of tax law governing transfer pricing developed 
by the United States has influenced regulation of this type of 
pricing in other nations.28 The concept of transfer pricing, as 
developed by the United States and currently the internation-
ally predominant theory,29 is that transfer pricing between 
entities should always reflect an "arm's length" price,30 the 
price which unrelated and uninterested entities would charge 
each other; this arm's length price should be charged even if 
the entities are somehow related or otherwise share mutual 
interests. The purpose of arm's length pricing is to ensure that 
the profit margin falls within the geographical territory to 
which it is attributable and can be taxed by that state. 
Although taxation still falls within the sovereign power of 
each nation, recognition of the need for international coopera-
tion and compatible standards has led to the development of 
international models, definitions, and a vast network of bilat-
eral treaties. Effective and non-duplicative taxation in a situa-
tion involving transfer pricing between entities subject to var-
ied national taxing regimes requires those nations to interact 
and to understand each other's systems. This article includes a 
brief examination of how the United States and Japan have 
addressed transfer pricing within and between their tax ad-
ministrations. These two countries serve as solid examples as 
they have developed transfer pricing regimes, are major trad-
ing partners, and have signed a bilateral tax treaty.31 Both 
Japan and the United States are actively developing their 
28. See Sven-Olof Lodin, Is the American Approach Fair? - Some Critical Views 
on the Transfer Pricing Issues, 5 INTERTAX 240 (1995) (explaining the influence of 
U.S. regulations to § 482 prior to 1992 on OECD, its member countries, as well as 
other countries); see also Connolly, supra note 3, at 340. 
29. See Leslie B. Samuels, Remarks on Revenue Estimating and the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guideline, 2 INTERTAX 64, 68 (1995) (written version of speech 
given by Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Treasury). 
30. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482·l(b)(I) (1996). 
31. U.S.-Japan Tax Treaty, supra note 8. 
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transfer pricing administrations and are extensively involved 
in the development of international guidelines.32 
B. UNITED STATES TRANSFER PRICING REGULATION 
The United States regulates transfer pricing for both do-
mestic and international transactions under the same overall 
law. Under Section 482 (hereinafter § 482) of the Internal 
Revenue Code, the Secretary of the Treasury is granted exten-
sive power to make appropriate adjustments to an entity's 
reported income, expenses, credits, allowances, and so on, in 
reference to transactions of tangibles or intangibles, in order to 
prevent evasion of taxes or to more accurately reflect real in-
come.33 Administration of such a broad-sweeping section ne-
cessitates guidelines, standards, procedures, and systems. The 
major focus on implementation of § 482 began after the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986, wherein Congress focused on the inade-
quacy of the administration of this section, particularly in the 
transfer of intangibles.34 Section 482 was modified to require 
32. The United States and Japan have been involved in the development and 
implementation of the DECO transfer pricing work. Additionally, Japan and the 
United States are both members of the Pacific Association of Tax Administrators 
[hereinafter PATA], as are Australia and Canada. PATA members agreed upon 
expedited exchange of information guidelines in order to facilitate tax examinations 
and broad procedural guidelines in order to facilitate the competent authority 
portion of obtaining bilateral APAs. See Toshio Miyatake, Transfer Pricing in Ja-
pan, 2 THE TAX TREATMENT OF TRANSFER PRICING, Japan 1, Japan 51 (lnt'l Bu-
reau of Fisc. Doc. ed. 1995); see also Sources Say At Least Two Japanese Banks 
Seeking Bilateral APAs with United States, Transfer Pricing (BNA) at 204 (Aug. 2, 
1995) [hereinafter Japanese Banks Seeking Bilateral APAs]. 
33. In this regard I.R.C. § 482 (1996) provides: 
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or busi-
nesses (whether or not incorporated, whether or not orga-
nized in the United States, and whether or not affiliated) 
owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same 
interests, the Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allo-
cate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances be-
tween or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, 
if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or 
allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of 
taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such orga-
nizations, trades, or businesses. In the case of any trans-
fer (or license) of intangible property (within the meaning 
of section 936(h)(3)(B)), the income with respect to such 
transfer or license shall be commensurate with the income 
attributable to the intangible. 
34. Bobbe Hirsh et aI., Final Transfer Pricing Regulations Restate Arm's 
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that pricing for intangible property via a controlled transaction 
be commensurate with income produced by that property.3S 
The Treasury Department produced a study in 1988, popularly 
known as the "White Paper," in response to Congressional 
concerns regarding the need for and possibilities of more thor-
ough administration of transfer pricing.3s The White Paper 
reinforced and accentuated the need for a more effective and 
efficient system to collect the tax revenue lost due to transfer 
pricing practices.37 
Since the White Paper, development of § 482 and the sup-
porting regulations and procedures has been extensive and is 
still underway.3s The U.S. regulations regarding transfer pric-
ing abuse are considered to be the most aggressive.39 Not only 
have the regulations relating to this section become increas-
Length Principle, 72 TAXES 587, 587-588 (Oct. 1994). 
35. "In the case of any transfer (or license) of intangible property (within the 
meaning of section 936(h)(3)(B)), the income with respect to such transfer or li-
cense shall be commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible." I.R.C. 
§ 482 (1996) (last sentence). 
36. TREASURY DEP'T, A STUDY OF INTERCOMPANY PRICING UNDER SECTION 482 
OF THE CODE (1988), reprinted in Notice 88-123, 1988-2 C.Y. 458. 
37. See id .. 
38. In 1994, the IRS released final § 482 regulations of general application, 
and those for determining the transfer prices for related party transfers of tangible 
property and intangible property. See T.D. 8552, 59 Fed. Reg. 34971 (1994). In 
1995, transfer pricing regulations were issued for research and development cost 
sharing. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7 (1996). One foreign tax specialist has critically 
noted this burgeoning body of regulations: 
The new regulations fill almost 150 pages and, including 
already existing rules concerning transfer pricing, the 
total number of pages of regulations aiming at developing 
the principles laid down in the few sentences of IRC Sec-
tion 482 amounts to approximately 250 . . . . [a]lthough 
there are reasons to believe that this pile of rules and 
formulas will only to a very limited extent improve the 
possibilities to solve the transfer pricing issues in a fair 
and satisfactory way. 
Lodin, supra note 27. 
39. See Todd Wolosoff, IRS Issues Final Transfer PriCing Penalty Regulations, 
12 TAX NOTES INT'L 706 (Mar. 4, 1996); see also Steven P. Hannes et aI., Han-
dling Controuersy and Planning Effectiuely Under the Final IRS Transfer Pricing 
Penalty Regulations, 12 TAX NOTES INT'L 671, 672-673 (Feb. 26, 1996) ("the tax-
payer bears the heavy burden of proving in a tax audit that its transfer pricing 
was 'correct,' and that an IRS-proposed pricing adjustment is 'wrong'") (citing 
Altama Delta Corp. v. Comm'r, 104 T.C. No. 22 (1995); Seagate Tech., Inc. v. 
Comm'r, 102 T.C. 149, 164 (1994); and Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Comm'r, 66 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 634, 656-657 (1993). 
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ingly detailed, but they are also now reinforced by contempora-
neous documentation and disclosure rules, as well as signifi-
cant penalty provisions for substantial misstatement of trans-
fer prices.40 
The officially stated purpose of section 482 is to ensure 
that taxpayers clearly reflect income attributable to "controlled 
transactions," and to prevent the avoidance of taxes with re-
spect to such transactions.41 The existence of control is not a 
bright line, but is based on an examination of facts and cir-
cumstances, along with subjective assessment. The definition 
of "controlled" in the regulations is that it: "includes any kind 
of control, direct or indirect, whether legally enforceable, and 
however exercisable or exercised. It is the reality of the control 
which is decisive, not its form or the mode of its exercise. A 
presumption of control arises if income or deductions have been 
arbitrarily shifted."42 
Section 482 attempts to place a controlled taxpayer on a 
tax parity with an uncontrolled taxpayer, the "arm's length 
standard," which entails determining the true taxable income 
by what the results of the transaction would have been if un-
dertaken by uncontrolled taxpayers under the same circum-
stances.43 The determination of whether or not a transaction 
is controlled and which income is attributable to which part of 
a transactions is, unlike the simplicity of the goal, a gargan-
tuan task and, often, if not always, virtually impossible to 
accomplish with precision.44 
40. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662 (1996); see also Marc M. Levey et aI., Final 482 Regs. 
Aim At More Flexibility But Retain IRS Audit Focus, 5 J. INT'L TAX'N 456 (1994) 
[hereinafter Levey et aI., Final 482 Regs.] ("armed with mountains of contempora· 
neous documentation required . . . taxpayers can be assured that the IRS will con-
duct audits of controlled-party transactions with unprecedented detail and zeal and 
that they truly will be required to meet their heavy burden of proof."). 
41. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(1) (1996). 
42. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-IA(a)(3) (emphasis added). 
43. See Treas. Reg. § 1.4B2-1(b)(1). 
44. The number of articles, books, and seminars produced, as well as the as-
sortment of accounting firms, attorneys, and other specialists who make their 
living in this means is phenomenal. An entire article could be written cataloguing 
and comparing the sources of assistance in this regard. As an exhaustive list is 
beyond the scope of this article; several helpful articles are noted. See D. Kevin 
Dolan et aI., Final Transfer Pricing Regulations, 23 TAX MGMT. INT'L J. 423 
(1994); see also Laurent P. Guerard, Selecting the Best Method: A Primer, 4 Trans-
11
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The current regulations require that the transfer pricing 
method selected confirm or determine what the transfer price 
would be in an arm's length transaction and must follow the 
"best method rule."45 These provide the following methods for 
ascertaining the arm's length result in transactions based on 
the transfer of tangible property: comparable uncontrolled 
price, resale price, cost plus, comparable profit, profit split, and 
unspecified methods.46 The best method is the one which pro-
vides the most reliable measure of an arm's length result given 
the specific set of circumstances and considering the com-
pleteness and accuracy of the data and the degree of compara-
bility between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions.47 
More than one method may be appropriate and there may be 
several possible applications.48 
Although pricing decisions are made for a myriad of rea-
sons other than immediate maximization of profit, the regula-
tions governing the application of § 482 do not include many 
ways to justify a deviation from the arm's length standard.49 
For example, justifying pricing as a market strategy is limited 
to situations when the taxpayer is entering a new market and 
trying to establish a market share, and then only if the strate-
fer Pricing, Special Report No. 18 (BNA) at 1 (Oct. 18, 1995); Marc M. Levey & 
Cym H. Lowell, Transfer Pricing Exam Strategy Evolves To A New Standard, 6 J. 
INT'L TAX'N 504 (1995); Daniel S. Levy et aI., Economics and the New Transfer 
Pricing Regulations: Achieving Arm's Length Through the Invisible Hand, 4 Trans-
fer Pricing, Special Report No. 17 (BNA) at 1 (May 24, 1995); John P. Warner, 
General Principles of Transfer Pricing Under the Final Revised Transfer Pricing 
Rules, 36 TAX MGMT. MEMORANDUM 35 (1995); John P. Warner, Transfer Pricing 
Under the Final Revised Transfer Pricing Rules, 36 TAX MGMT. MEMORANDUM 51 
(1995). 
45. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c). 
46. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(a) (1996). For a thorough description of these meth-
ods and their application, see Guerard, supra note 43, at 1. For the examples 
developed by the IRS, see examples given within the text of Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-
1-1.482-8. 
47. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c)(2). However, the taxpayer must maintain docu-
mentation to establish that the method used provides the "most accurate" measure 
of an arm's length result. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6(d)(2)(iii)(A), (C) (1996). 
48. See Levey et aI., supra note 39, at 457. 
49. For a discussion of parent-survival premium as potential deviation from 
arm's length standard, with a specific analysis of National Semiconductor Corp., 
see Marc M. Levey & Gregg A. Grauer, Recognizing 'Parent-Survival Premium' in 
Transfer Pricing, 5 J. INT'L TAX 541 (1994). 
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gy is comparable to that a similar company would pursue with-
in the industry. 50 ' 
The best method rule, although flexible in appearance, 
requires significant time, expense, and risk to fulfill due to the 
need to review all methods to determine the best and the 
chance that the Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter I.R.S. or 
Service) may have a different opinion.51 In order to gain the 
most credibility and protection, the choice of method to be used 
for a transfer pricing study should be based on the comparabil-
ity and the quality of the data and assumptions. 52 
Although access to information may be difficult or limited, 
the taxpayer should strive to use the most comparable uncon-
trolled transactions available, as determined by the similarity 
of: functions of the parties, contractual terms, assignment of 
risks, economics, and property and services provided by either 
party.53 The Service, taxpayers, and tax professionals have 
asserted that public information and voluntarily shared data 
are not sufficient for an investigation of transfer pricing cas-
es.54 Through its summons authority,55 however, the Service 
has the power to acquire private business information to use 
for third party comparables.56 The dilemma for the taxpayer 
50. See Levey et aI., supra note 39, at 458 (noting that, given a competitive 
world, the information required to document this may be impossible to obtain); see 
also Carlton M. Smith, Documentation Needed to Avoid Penalties Specified by 
Transfer Pricing Temp. Regs, 80 J. TAX'N 304, 304-307 (1994) (note tone of article 
following subtitle stating, in part, "IRS is essentially asking for an indexed audit 
file."). 
51. Levey et aI., Transfer Pricing, supra note 24, at §7: I.E. 
52. Cf Treas. Reg. § 1.6662(d)(2)(ii) (1996); see Levey et aI., supra note 39, at 
457; see also Hannes et al., supra note 38, at 672-673 (explaining why a taxpayer 
should at least document why it is reasonable to conclude that no further consid-
eration of other methods is necessary). 
53. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-l(d)(3) (1994). See Levey et aI., Final 4B2 Regs., supra 
note 39, at 457. 
54. See Ryan J. Donmoyer et aI., IRS To Pursue More Third·Party 
Comparables in Transfer Pricing Cases, 10 TAX NOTES INT'L 894 (Mar. 13, 1995). 
For a discussion of the results of an IRS survey showing the inadequacy of the 
third party comparable information available to the Service from public sources 
and voluntarily shared information, see IRS Survey Results Reveal Inadequacy of 
Third Party Information Data Sources, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at G-1 (Mar. 
3, 1995). 
55. I.R.C. § 7602 (1996). 
56. See Donmoyer et aI., supra note 53, at 894 (quoting Margaret Richardson, 
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is how to determine and acquire the highest quality data possi-
ble,57 given that the most comparable information would prob-
ably be that of the taxpayer's most direct competitors. 58 Once 
a taxpayer has determined the information available on 
comparables and the industry as a whole, the choice remains 
as to which method most reliably reflects an arm's length price 
given the specific circumstances of the transaction studied. 
Transfer pricing studies can be done in-house or by an 
outsider. 59 Whether or not to actually devote the resources for 
documentation, either internally or externally, is a manage-
ment decision, which may be based on potential penalty expo-
sure.60 In deciding whether or not to document, a taxpayer 
should consider that extensive contemporaneous documenta-
tion created by the time of filing the return may provide the 
taxpayer with protection from transfer pricing penalties.61 
Any documentation prepared must be carefully and thoroughly 
analyzed and supportive of the taxpayer's position as the IRS 
IRS Commissioner, affirming the Service's right to obtain third party comparable 
information, explaining past practice as exercising "restraint," and noting that this 
will change if necessary to get "the information we need to effectively administer 
the transfer pricing regime."}. 
57. For a thorough discussion of the importance of quality data, how to identi-
fy it, assess it, substantiate it, and make appropriate adjustments, see Marc M. 
Levey et a!., Defining 'Quality' Data in a Transfer Pricing Analysis, 7 J. INT'L TAX 
4 (1996). 
58. See Levey et a!., Final 4B2 Regs., supra note 39, at 457. 
59. See Taxpayers Should Not Rush into Studies for §6662 Purposes, Tax Exec-
utive Says, Transfer Pricing (BNA) at 111 (July 3, 1996) [hereinafter Taxpayers 
Should Not Rush into Studies for §6662 PurposesJ. 
60. See id. at 111 (quoting Alan O. Dixler, Merck & Co.'s senior tax counsel). 
61. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6(d)(2)(iii) (1996). This documentation must in-
clude the following: 
1. Overview of the taxpayer's business, including analysis of economic and 
legal factors affecting the pricing; 
2. Description of organization and of all related parties engaged in, directly 
or indirectly, affecting pricing; 
3. Documentation explicitly required by § 482 regulations; 
4. Description of method and why selected; 
5. Description of methods considered and why not selected; 
6. Description of controlled transactions and internal data used to analyze 
them; 
7. Description of comparables used, determination of what is "comparable" 
and adjustments made; and, 
8. Explanation of economic analysis and projections relied upon in develop-
ing the method. 
See Wolosoff, supra note 38, at 708. 
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or a foreign tax authority can use the documentation provided 
to construe and support an adjustment or penalty.62 
Although transfer pricing issues are complex for tangible 
products, transfer pricing issues in the areas of services and 
intangibles are even more difficult to analyze. Transfer pricing 
regulations for intangibles are a current priority for the Ser-
vice as intangibles constitute a substantial and ever-increasing 
factor in U.S. exports in recent years.63 The current methods 
available for determining an arm's length price are difficult to 
apply to intangibles. For example, in the situation where reli-
able internal comparable intangibles exist, the comparable 
uncontrolled transaction method can be used (and some insist 
it must be used) to determine transfer prices for intangible 
property.64 The other two specified methods for intangibles 
are the comparable profits method and profit split method.65 
The proposed regulations for services were originally scheduled 
to be completed during 1996, but the project was dropped mid-
year for unspecified reasons.66 
One uncertain area in regard to transfer pricing for intan-
gibles has been the determination of ownership of an intangi-
ble, and, therefore, the appropriate allocations of and adjust-
ments to income, expenses, and profit. Prior to 1994, the "de-
veloper," the party that created the intangible's economic val-
ue, was entitled to profit from the intangible.67 The regula-
tions now provide that determination of ownership of an intan-
62. See Hannes et aI., supra note 38, at 679-680 (discussing further on pp. 
681-683 the advisability of initial information preparation under the attorney-client 
privilege in order to determine direction and strategy). 
63. Intellectual property exports were estimated at 12% in 1983 and 25% of 
total U.S. exports in 1991. Jeffrey E. Garten, American Trade Law in a Changing 
World Economy, 29 INT'L LAW. 15, 22 (1995) (citing Ralph Oman, Register of 
Copyright). U.S. financial services exports in 1994 were more than $8 billion. See 
Garten, supra note 12, at 57. 
64. For a detailed analysis and examples of why and how the CUT method 
must be used in this situation, see Richard P. Rozek, Applying the Best Method 
Rule When Reliable Internal Comparable Intangibles Exist, 12 TAX NOTES INT'L 
1191 (Apr. 18, 1996). 
65. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4{a) (1996). 
66. IRS Drops Project to Propose Rules for Pricing Related-Party Services in 
1996, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 107, at G-3 (June 4, 1996). 
67. See, Richard Boykin, Transfer Pricing Policy Issues: Who Is the Developer?, 
12 TAX NOTES INT'L 279 (Jan. 22, 1996). 
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gible begins with the legal owners of the right to exploit the 
intangible.s8 In order to clarify pricing and expenses, the reg-
ulations now allow for the allocation of profits derived from an 
intangible to be specified by the parties through the creation of 
an appropriate research and development cost sharing ar-
rangement. 69 
C. TRANSFER PRICING ENFORCEMENT AND ISSUE RESOLUTION 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
1. Adjustments 
Transfer pricing is a priority area of enforcement for the 
IRS and the Treasury. 70 The adjustments emanating from 
application of § 482 represent a growing potential source of tax 
revenue. Although a lesser amount will eventually be realized 
as revenue, the IRS had $911 million in unagreed adjustments 
from large case examinations at the end of fiscal 1995; this 
represented an increase of fifty percent over the $615 million 
for fiscal 1994.71 
2. Penalty Regulations 
The United States' transfer pricing penalties constitute the 
most severe of all countries.72 Transfer pricing penalties are 
made at two levels: the specific transactional level and the net 
section 482 adjustment penalty for affiliated groups filing a 
consolidated return.73 The penalty thresholds are low enough 
68. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(0 (1996). 
69. In December 1995, the IRS finalized regulations dealing with research and 
development cost-sharing. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7 (1996). For a deSCription and 
analysis of the extensive documentation and comprehensive contract required under 
the provisions of this regulation, see Hannes et aI., supra note 38, at 677-678. 
70. Transfer pricing is the center focus of a program entitled 'Tax Compliance 
in a Global Economy" jointly announced by the Treasury Department and the 
Internal Revenue Service in 1994. See Samuels, supra note 28, at 65. 
71. See Unagreed Transfer Pricing Adjustments, supra note 25, at G-2. 
72. See WolosofT, supra note 38, at 706. 
73. Under I.R.C. § 6662(e),(h) (1996) penalties include: 
Transaction penalty for a valuation misstatement: 
- 20% penalty for pricing which is either 200% or more than correct price 
or 50% or less; 
- 40% penalty for pricing which is 400% or more than correct price or 25% 
or less; 
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to be crossed easily by a taxpayer with a large volume of trans-
national transactions.74 The penalties constitute a sufficient 
financial burden that, for many taxpayers, avoiding them is as 
important, if not more important, than avoiding double taxa-
tion.75 Also, the penalty statute has already had the unintend-
ed, but appropriate, effect of causing some tax directors to em-
brace transfer pricing as a U.S. and foreign tax planning op-
portunity, not just a problem.76 
The Service may exclude a transfer pncmg adjustment 
from penalty provisions if the pricing analysis is documented 
as set forth in the regulations and if either the specified or 
unspecified method requirement for establishing an arm's 
length price is met.77 If the documentation process is to serve 
as an effective prophylactic against penalties, it should not 
only be thorough, but also begun early.78 In order to serve as 
an exception to penalties, the documentation requirements for 
the specified method must: be met by documents created by 
the time of filing for the given year, be furnished to the IRS 
within thirty days of an IRS request, and include documenta-
tion setting forth the taxpayer's business, relationships, struc-
ture, and a thorough pricing analysis.79 The extent and thor-
- 40% penalty for the failure to charge for transfer of any tangible or in-
tangible property. 
Net § 482 Adjustment Penalty: 
- 20% penalty if net adjustment exceeds either $5 million or 10% of gross 
receipts; 
- 40% penalty if net adjustment exceeds either $20 million or 20% of gross 
receipts. 
For an overview see Wolosoff, supra note 38, at 709. 
74. Note that an IRS adjustment of 1% on an amount over $5 million would 
subject the entity to the 20% net adjustment penalty. See Birnkrant & Croker, Jr., 
supra note 15, at 268; see also Hannes et aI., supra note 38, at 672-673. The final 
regulations do allow that if a proposed adjustment is small in relation to the 
dollar amount of the controlled transaction to which it relates, this fact is relevant 
in determining if a taxpayer made a reasonable effort to apply a specified or un-
specified method. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6(d)(2)(ii)(G) (1996). 
75. See Bimkrant & Croker, Jr., supra note 15, at 268. 
76. See Hannes et aI., supra note 38, at 672. 
77. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6(d) (1996); see footnote 60, supra, for list of docu-
mentation required. 
78. Cf Hannes et aI., supra note 38, at 671 (discussing specifically how tax 
planning and documentation should be conducted to avoid penalty and adjustment 
exposure). 
79. See Wolosoff, supra note 38, at 708. The list of documents required is 
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oughness of data research required in order to be safe are 
considered to be a facts and circumstances test, but remain 
nebulous.80 The Appeals Division of the IRS is faced with a 
heavy burden in cases subject to transfer pricing penalties due 
to the extensive documentation which must be analyzed in the 
re-calculation of the penalties and the assessment as to wheth-
er the documentation suffices to meet the regulations.81 
3. Advance Pricing Agreements 
In order to alleviate the uncertainty, cost, and time spent 
resolving transfer pricing disputes, the United States created 
the advance pricing agreement process (hereinafter APA).82 
This is one of several methods of alternative dispute resolution 
initiated by the Service in order to increase voluntary compli-
ance by taxpayers.83 APAs are agreements that for a fixed 
term, the authority will accept an agreed transfer pricing 
method used by a group. Such agreements are formal in nature 
with fixed terms and limits; they are obtained through a pro-
cess of formal inquiry and negotiation and based on statute.84 
The AP A is the only way for the taxpayer to achieve pricing 
certainty and penalty avoidance. 
The costs of establishing an AP A are large enough for both 
the taxpayer and the participating tax bodies so that the costs 
and benefits require careful consideration. An AP A involves 
three types of costs: internal time, consultants' fees, and gov-
ernmental fees.85 The taxpayer bears a very substantial cost 
given in Treas. Reg. § 1.6662·6(d)(2)(iii)(B) (1996). 
80. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662·6(d)(2)(ii)(B) (1996) ("the expense of additional 
efforts to locate new data may be weighed against the likelihood of finding addi· 
tional data that would improve the reliability of the results and the amount by 
which any new data would change the taxpayer's taxable income."); see also IRS 
Final Regulations, 12 TAX NOTES INT'L 563, 564 (Feb. 19, 1996). 
81. See IRS Appeals Division Studying How To Handle Transfer Pricing Penal-
ties, Dougherty Says, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 195, at G-2 (Oct. 10, 1995). [here-
inafter IRS Appeals Division Studying How To Handle Transfer Pricing Penaltiesl. 
82. See Seymour Zwick & Theresa Dilvorth, Alternative Dispute Resolution or 
Examination by IRS, TranSfer Pricing (BNA) at 455 (Dec. 13, 1995). 
83. See m .. 
84. This reflects an international definition of APAs, used by Ernst & Young 
for an international transfer pricing study. Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing, supra 
note 2, at 295. 
85. See m. at 310. 
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in terms of time and money in putting together the informa-
tion required for an APA and negotiating it with the taxing au-
thorities involved.86 However, the analysis, planning, and doc-
umentation required to prepare an AP A build on the work nec-
essary to protect oneself from the penalty regulations in the 
event of a transfer pricing controversy.87 Previously completed 
AP As are not published or disclosed88 and do not serve as pre-
cedent.89 In the United States, the sheer volume of informa-
tion involved and the unique nature of each case create an 
enormous work load for the IRS.90 
The APA process is lauded by a number of the participants 
as a solution to transfer pricing issues. Despite the cost, time, 
and effort involved, a number of tax practitioners still believe 
the APA process to be the most effective alternative dispute 
resolution method for taxpayers to resolve transfer pricing 
issues.91 A number of multinational corporations also believe 
that the AP A process is of major benefit as it affords compa-
nies a greater level of certainty as to the tax implications of 
their covered activities.92 The number of AP As is actually 
growing,93 although it is not certain that it will be possible for 
86. See id .. 
87. See Hannes et aI., supra note 38, at 680. 
88. See, e.g., IRS Asks Court to Dismiss BNA Lawsuit Seeking Disclosure of 
APA Methodologies, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 83, at G-4 (Apr. 30, 1996). 
89. However, a taxpayer may rely on a transfer pricing methodology developed 
and applied in its own APA in post-APA years as "reasonable" in order to avoid 
penalties. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6(d)(2)(ii)(F) (1996). 
90. See, e.g., Manhattan District Office Designates Two Officials To Handle 
APA Requests, Transfer Pricing (BNA) at 99 (June 21, 1995) (for the first time at 
the district level, IRS designates two officials at Manhattan office to handle heavy 
APA load). 
91. See, e.g., Zwick & Dilvorth, supra note 81, at 459; see also Taxpayers 
Should Not Rush into Studies for §6662 Purposes, supra note 58, at 111 (quoting 
Alan O. Dixler, Merck & Co.'s senior tax counsel: "If you can mobilize the resourc-
es, then do an APA. It takes the transfer pricing issue off the table."). 
92. See Snyder, supra note 13, at 1068-1069; see also Study Shows Authorities 
Aggressively Questioning Practices of Multinationals, 137 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) G-2 
(July 18, 1995) (citing a 64% of a survey of 210 multinational corporations based 
in the U.S., U.K, Australia, France, Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands, as 
stating that they would "likely" or "very likely" use APAs). 
93. For example, government studies covering years past have indicated that 
the number of completed APAs in March, 1993, was 9, and as of January, 1995, 
was approximately 26. See supra TAX POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION ISSUES, note 4, 
at 7. 
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it to grow to sufficient capacity for the rapidly increasing num-
ber of transactions with potential transfer pricing issues. 
4. Mediation 
In order to expedite transfer pncmg cases, the Service 
decided to try mediation as a methodology for resolving trans-
fer pricing issues between the taxpayer and the Service.94 The 
mediator is jointly selected by the parties, either from another 
Appeals office or from outside of the Service,95 and some tax-
payers are requesting and being allowed to have two mediators 
handle a case, one from Appeals and one from outside the IRS; 
each mediator hears the case separately.96 
5. Hybrid: Concurrent Advance Pricing Agreement and Joint 
Consideration of Pending Disputes 
One successful program involves joint resolution of trans-
fer pricing issues by Appeals and the u.s. Competent Authori-
ty.97 The Service is considering an alternative dispute resolu-
tion program which would allow a taxpayer to resolve potential 
transfer pricing disputes and pending disputes on the Exami-
nation, Appeals, and docketed levels by requesting an AP A 
and, under the Simultaneous Appeals Process (SAP), joint 
consideration of pending disputes.98 
94. See Announcement 95-2, supra note 9 (announcing a one year trial period 
beginning October 30, 1995). All of June, 1996, three cases had been resolved 
through this program; none involved § 482; see IRS Devising Way to Settle Docket-
ed Cases Based on APAs, Appeals Settlement Terms, Transfer Pricing (BNA) at 
109-110 (July 3, 1996) (reporting an address made by Thomas Louthan, director of 
Appeals' Office of Dispute Resolution & Specialty Programs at a World Trade 
Institute seminar) [hereinafter IRS Devising Way to Settle Docketed Cases]. 
95. See supra Announcement 95-2, note 9 (announcing a one year trial period 
beginning October 30, 1995). 
96. See IRS Devising Way to Settle Docketed Cases, supra note 93, at 110. 
97. See IRS Appeals Division Studying How To Handle Transfer Pricing Penal-
ties, supra note 80, at G-2. 
98. See IRS Devising Way to Settle Docketed Cases, supra note 93, at 110. 
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D. JAPANESE TRANSFER PRICING REGULATION 
Japan's international transfer pricing rules are distinct 
from its domestic rules to prevent tax avoidance via arbitrary 
pricing.99 Japanese international transfer pricing rules were 
enacted and codified as Article 66-5 (later 66-4) of the Special 
Taxation Measures Law (STML) on 28 March 1986, based on a 
report by the Tax Commission in December of the previous 
year on the extent of transfer pricing and the need for new tax 
provisions. loo Although the drafters of the Japanese transfer 
pricing rules studied the rules of a number of countries, includ-
ing the United States, they chose to use the Model developed 
by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (hereinafter OECD Model)lOl as a basis for Japan's 
transfer pricing legislation. lo2 
In order to make an adjustment for transfer pricing, the 
government must prove both that the transaction was conduct-
ed between a corporation subject to Japanese corporate tax and 
its foreign related person, and that the price charged was not 
an arm's length price. 103 In the event that a corporation's 
transaction price in a transaction with a foreign related per-
son 104 is not an arm's length price/05 it may be adjusted to 
an arm's length price for the purpose of the computation of 
corporation tax. lOS A sufficient relationship exists to investi-
99. The three traditional approaches under Japanese corporate tax law for 
dealing with tax avoidance based on arbitrary pricing are: (1) by reference to the 
definition of revenue, (2) through the use of the provisions governing donations, 
and (3) the denial of acts or accounting of a family company. See Miyatake, supra 
note 31, at Japan 13-16 (describing the use and effect of these three approaches). 
100. See id. at Japan 16-17. 
101. Model Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital, 1977, Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development [hereinafter Model Double Taxa-
tion Convention]. The OECD Model was revised in 1992 and again in 1995. Model 
Tax Convention on Income and Capital, Sept. 1, 1992, Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, Tax Treaties (CCH) 'll 191, Tax Treaties (WGL) 
'll 2001 [hereinafter Model Tax Convention on Income]. 
102. See Miyatake, supra note 31, at Japan 17. 
103. The government has the burden of proof in transfer pricing taxation cases. 
See id. at Japan 60. 
104. Japan's international transfer pricing provisions apply only to transactions 
conducted by an entity required to pay corporation tax in Japan with a foreign 
related corporation. See id. at Japan 23. 
105. See Business in Japan, 51 7th TAX MGMT. PORT. (BNA) II.B.6.b.(2) (1996) 
[hereinafter Business in Japan]. 
106. See Miyatake, supra note 31, at Japan 17 (including those in force as of 
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gate transfer pricing issues when one of two special relation-
ships exist: either corporation directly or indirectly owns 50% 
or more of the total issued shares of the other, or controls said 
corporation "in substance."lo7 Control in substance means 
that one corporation can basically determine all or a portion of 
the business policies of the other corporation due to relation-
ship(s) between the officers, employees, or corporations as a 
whole. !Os 
Japan has specifically adopted the concept and definition 
of arm's length price as stated in the 1979 GECD Report on 
Transfer Pricing, as well as emulates its methods for comput-
ing an arm's length price. 109 In Japan, an arm's length trans-
action price for the sale of tangible property is computed under 
one of three methods: comparable price, normal reseller's prof-
it, or cost plus normal supplier's profit. 11o The Japanese Min-
istry of Finance also plans to add an additional transfer pric-
ing method approved by the OECD, the transactional net mar-
gin method (TNMM); under this method, profits are calculated 
in light of typical profit margins of comparable, unaffiliated 
taxpayers. III The tax office also has the flexibility to consider 
costs and expenses of business, fixed assets used in the busi-
ness, and other factors if one of the three primary methods 
cannot be used to determine an arm's length transaction 
price. 112 
The determination of an arm's length transaction price for 
transactions other than the sale of inventory is authorized 
July 1994) (explaining the provisions of Art. 66-4, para. 1 of the Special Tax Mea-
sures Law). 
107. See Boidman et al., Transfer Pricing Rules and Practice in Japan, TRANs-
FER PRICING: FOREIGN RULES AND PRACTICE OUTSIDE OF EUROPE, TAX MGMT. 
PORT. (BNA) ch. 33, II.A3.c (1996); see also Miyatake, supra note 31, at Japan 18-
21 (including diagrams of how to determine 50% ownership in a chain of owner-
ship). 
108. See Boidman et al., supra note 106, at ch. 33, II.A3.c.2. (citing and ex-
plaining Special Taxation Measures Law Enforcement Order No. 43 of 1957 as 
amended, article 39-12). 
109. See Miyatake, supra note 31, at Japan 21. 
110. See Business in Japan, supra note 104, at I1.B.6.h.(2). 
111. Pre-Confirmation System To Be Made Law To Expedite Agreements, MoF 
Officials Say, Transfer Pricing (BNA) at 94 (June 16, 1996) [hereinafter Pre-Confir-
mation System To Be Made Law J. 
112. Business in Japan, supra note 104, at II.B.6.h.(2). 
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using methods "similar" to those used for tangible goods. U3 
Additionally, a safe harbor exists for rental of Japanese real 
estate to foreign affiliates, due to the high value of real estate 
in Japan.1l4 
E. TRANSFER PRICING ENFORCEMENT AND ISSUE RESOLUTION 
IN JAPAN 
1. Adjustments 
The Commissioner of the National Tax Administration 
(hereinafter NTA) has the ultimate authority to make transfer 
pricing adjustments, but the actual adjustments are made by 
examiners.u5 During its 1994 tax year, ending June, 1994, 
the NT A issued 60 deficiency assessments, totaling 120 billion 
yen, approximately $1.5 billion U.S .. us 
2. Advance Pricing Agreements 
The National Tax Administration initiated its Pre-Confir-
mation System (herinafter PCS) program, for unilateral ad-
vance agreements, in 1987.117 The application for a PCS re-
quests disclosure and a thorough analysis of the transactions, 
relationships, and justification of the selected transfer pricing 
method. 118 Each PCS requires an economic study and may 
113. See id .. 
114. An annual rental of 8% of the value of the real estate as appraised for 
inheritance tax is acceptable. This appraisal is normally considered to be much 
less than the fair market value. In order to avail itself of this safe harbor, the 
rental must be confirmed with the tax office and is subject to revision when the 
appraisal is reviewed, usually every 3 years. See id .. 
115. See Miyatake, supra note 31, at Japan 50. 
116. NTA To Shift AFA Functions To Regional Bureaus, Sources Say, Transfer 
Pricing (BNA) at 77 (June 7, 1995) [hereinafter NTA To Shift AFA Functions To 
Regional Bureaus]. 
117. Japan, Transfer Pricing (BNA) at 12 (Apr. 12, 1995) [hereinafter Japan, 
Transfer Pricing]. 
118. Information is requested about: 
- The taxpayer's foreign affiliate; 
- The volume and value of related-party transactions; 
- Terms and conditions of the transactions; 
- Functions performed by the taxpayer; 
- Market conditions; and 
- An explanation of why the selected transfer pricing methodology is the 
most reasonable. 
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take two to three years to negotiate , 119 although the NTA is 
trying to expedite the negotiation process. 120 Apple Computer 
Japan Inc. and J.P. Morgan Inc.'s Japanese affiliate were the 
first two foreign taxpayers to use Japan's Pre-Confirmation 
System to receive prospective approval of transfer prices. 121 
The NTA is steadily increasing the size and impor-
tance122 of its transfer pricing function in response to the 
need to develop transfer pricing policy, as well as the ever-
increasing numbers of transfer pricing cases123 and requests 
for advance pricing agreements.124 Out of ten Japanese multi-
national corporations which participated in an international 
study of transfer pricing, seven view transfer pricing as the 
most important international tax issue facing them; and, all 
but one, expect the use of APAs to groW. 125 Six of the Japa-
nese multinational corporations in the aforementioned study 
See Japan, Transfer Pricing, supra note 116, at 12. The analysis given must in-
clude comparables and adjustments made for the study. Id .. 
119. See id.; see also Pre-Confirmation System To Be Made Law, supra note 
110, at 94 (practitioners estimating an average PCS agreement requires three 
years of negotiation). 
120. See, e.g., NTA To Shift AFA Functions To Regional Bureaus, supra note 
115, at 77; see also J.P. Morgan Concludes Bilateral APA with IRS, NTA, Sources 
Say, Transfer Pricing (BNA) at 367 (Nov. 1, 1995) (indicating that J.P. Morgan 
bilateral APA was approved by Japan's National Tax Administration approximately 
one year after filing request) [hereinafter J.P. Morgan Concludes Bilateral APA]. 
121. See J.P. Morgan Concludes Bilateral APA, supra note 119, at 367. 
122. The Japanese government plans to write a law as basis for the Pre-Con-
firmation System, rather than the current NTA notice, in order to gain it more 
respect, thereby increasing usage of it and expediting processing of PCS agree-
ments. See Pre-Confirmation System To Be Made Law, supra note 110, at 94. 
123. See NTA To Shift APA Functions To Regional Bureaus, supra note 115, at 
77 (reporting that NTA issued 60 deficiency assessments in 1994 tax year and 
anticipated 80 for its 1995 tax year). 
124. See, e.g., NTA Says 25 Examiner Jobs To Be Created; New Divisions in 
Kanto Plains, Tokyo Planned, Transfer Pricing (BNA) at 70 (June 5, 1996); see 
also NTA to Increase Transfer Pricing Staff by 17 in Regional Bureaus, Officials 
Say, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 99, at G-2 (May 22, 1996) (indicating also a status 
upgrade of office handling, competent authority issues to a division, and creation 
of new levels of hierarchy within existing transfer pricing administrative struc-
ture); NTA To Shift AFA Functions To Regional Bureaus, supra note 115, at 77 
(stating that shift is due to substantial increase in number of APA applications 
and will include corresponding increase in transfer pricing personnel); Pre-Confir-
mation System To Be Made Law, supra note 110, at 94 (estimating 20 applications 
for pes agreements pending from Japanese and foreign taxpayers as of June, 
1996). 
125. Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing, supra note 2, at 297. 
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have faced transfer pricing inquiries in countries in which they 
have subsidiaries; four of them also faced such inquiries in 
Japan. 126 
IV. INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN TRANSFER 
PRICING ADMINISTRATION 
The internationalization of legal regulation of multination-
al businesses is accelerating as countries attempt to keep pace 
with the globalization of the world business community. 127 
Although taxation is considered a sovereign domain of the 
nation-state, there is actual and potential conflict and overlap 
between international law and the tax laws of individual na-
tions. The bilateral tax treaties and national tax laws may not 
accord with each other, or with the provisions and detail of the 
increasing number of treaties and other international law 
governing international trade and business, including: GATI, 
WTO, EEC, NAFTA, ASEAN, APEC, OECD, and others. 
Resolution of overlaps and conflicts in the area of taxation 
in general and transfer pricing in particular is currently being 
addressed through a series of bilateral tax treaties as well as 
the work of international organizations to develop conventions, 
models, guidelines, and practices. This body of international 
work and cooperation is necessary not only to address areas of 
overlap or conflict between tax regimes, but also because the 
effective and efficient enforcement of taxation of multinational 
businesses requires multinational enforcement and coopera-
tion. 128 
A. BILATERAL TAX TREATIES 
Many nations have adopted bilateral tax treaties to pre-
vent tax evasion and double taxation. 129 International model 
tax treaties have been developed by the United Nations and 
the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development 
126. [d .. . 
127. See Lance C. Tyson, Unitary Apportioning: A Key to Global Tax Harmony, 
22 INT'L TAX'N J. 35 (1996). 
128. See O'Connor, supra, note 6, at iv. 
129. See, Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing, supra note 2, at 294. 
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(hereinafter OECD).130 Japan and the United States are par-
ties to a bilateral tax treaty (hereinafter U.S.-Japan Tax Trea-
ty).l31 Japan has concluded at least 45 income tax 
treaties,132 while the United States is a party to more than 
fifty-seven bilateral income tax treaties. 133 
The U.S.-Japan Tax Treaty, like the vast majority of tax 
treaties, contains a "competent authority" or "mutual agree-
ment" provision, authorizing the competent authority of each 
country to meet to resolve issues of misapplication or double 
taxation under the pertinent treaty. 134 The competent au-
thority for Japan is comprised of the Deputy Commissioner, 
International, and the Director, Office of International Opera-
tions/3s for the United States it is the Secretary of the Trea-
sury.13S The competent authority provisions also generally 
grant a residene37 of a contracting state the right to request 
the competent authority of that state to initiate proceedings in 
the case of double taxation or taxation which the taxpayer be-
lieves to conflict with the treaty.13B 
The issue of transfer pricing as it is defined involves a 
tension between the taxing authorities/interest of nations and 
the business(es) involved, which is particularly evident in the 
competent authority process, both in the United States and in 
Japan. The right to request competent authority assistance is 
not the right to receive such assistance. 139 The use of compe-
130. See Model Double Taxation Convention, supra note 100. 
131. See US-Japan Tax Treaty, supra note 8. 
132. See Miyatake, supra note 31, at Japan 11-12 (including those in force as of 
July, 1994). 
133. As of April, 1995, the United States had entered into 57 income tax trea-
ties. All but two of these (with Bermuda and Ireland) contain a provision whereby 
the competent authority of each country can meet to resolve issues of double taxa-
tion or inappropriate application of the terms of the treaty. See John Venuti et al., 
Requesting' Competent Authority Assistance: IRS Proposes New Procedure, 24 TAX 
MGMT. INT'L J. 229 (1995). 
134. See Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing, supra note 2, at 294. 
135. See Boidman et al., supra note 106, at ch. 33. 
136. It is delegated to the Assistant Commissioner (International) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Service. Delegation Order No. 114 (Rev. 9) § 1, 1990-2 C.B. 326. For 
a thorough discussion of competent authority and usage, see Paul C. Rooney & 
Nelson Suit, Competent Authority, 49 TAX LAw. 675 (1996). 
137. A resident in this sense includes either a natural person or a legal person, 
such as a corporation. 
138. See Rooney & Suit, supra note 135, at 675. 
139. For example, in the United States, if a taxpayer reaches a final settlement 
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tent authority to resolve issues of taxation between the state of 
the competent authority and another state or states can and 
often does create a situation of conflict of interest for the com-
petent authority.140 
In the United States, the competent authority has the 
discretion to initiate, continue, refuse, or terminate assistance 
without the consent or knowledge of the affected taxpayer, the 
entity requesting assistance, and without resolving the original 
issue(s).141 In fact, under the terms of the tax treaties, the 
U.S. competent authority has broad discretion and may even 
reach an agreement with a treaty partner on a basis inconsis-
tent with U.S. tax laws or regulations. 142 
In the Japanese system, the competent authority proce-
dure exists only due to treaty, and any domestic laws incorpo-
rating competent authority provisions merely implement the 
treaty-related powers. 143 No provisions exist under current 
law or regulations for unilateral adjustments in Japan solely to 
prevent double taxation.144 Therefore, in a double taxation 
situation, absent mutual agreement between competent au-
thorities of Japan and a treaty partner, it is unlikely that a 
taxpayer would receive unilateral relief from the Japanese 
authorities. 145 
with the I.R.S. field or Appeals on a potential competent authority issue, the com-
petent authority will not change the agreement if a corresponding adjustment 
cannot be reached with the competent authority of the treaty party. See Rev. Proc. 
96-13, 1996-3 I.R.B. 31; see also Hannes et aI., supra note 38, at 680 (explaining 
that the taxpayer must be strategic in sequencing pursuit of relief). 
140. See Rooney & Suit, supra note 135, at 676. 
141. See Venuti et aI., supra note 132, at 230. 
142. See id. at 230. The competent authorities can reach agreement on adjust-
ment without agreement on methodology; see Donmoyer et aI., supra note 53, at 
894 (reporting a statement of Frank Y. Ng, Director of the IRS Tax Treaty Divi-
sion). 
1,43. For a clear explanation of the extent and sources of power of competent 
authorities in Japan, as well as procedural aspects and considerations for filing for 
competent authority relief, see Boidman et aI., supra note 106, at ch. 33. 
144. See id. at ch. 33, V.A .. 
145. See id .. (citing as the authoritative source for this contention); HAYUKA, M., 
lTEN KAKAKu ZEISEI SHOUKAI [A DETAILED EXPLANATION OF THE TRANSFER PRIC-
ING TAX SYSTEM) 97 (Okura Saimu Kyokai, 1991). 
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In a recent survey, more than half of all U.S. multnational 
corporations responding consider the competent authority pro-
cedure unsatisfactory; for Japanese multinational corporations, 
slightly less than one-third found the competent authority 
procedure wanting. l46 The major reasons given for dissatis-
faction regarded the length of time involved in the process and 
the fact that, at the end, there is no guarantee that an agree-
ment will be reached.147 Nevertheless, both U.S. and foreign 
competent authorities are requiring even more extensive docu-
mentation from taxpayers if they want relief from double taxa-
tion. l48 However, the IRS and the NTA have specifically 
sought to expedite double taxation relief by developing a pro-
cess to allow U.S. taxpayers being audited in Japan to apply 
immediately to the U.S. competent authority, which could in 
turn initiate talks with the Japanese competent authority.149 
B. INTERNATIONAL USE OF ADVANCE PRICING AGREEMENTS 
Advance Pricing Agreements provide a means for business 
entities to reach a formal agreement with the competent au-
thorities of the states having potential tax jurisdiction over a 
given set of transactions. According to revenue authorities from 
countries having some form of AP A process, potential benefits 
to multinational corporations include: bringing more certainty 
and predictability to tax treatment of transfer pricing situa-
tions, limiting costs and time spent in examination, and reduc-
ing the possibility of litigation. 150 Benefits of APAs to the au-
thorities, according to them, included: a better understanding 
of a multinational corporation's business, increased certainty 
that the correct amount of tax is paid, and a better working 
relationship between tax authorities of different nations. 151 
146. Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing, supra note 2, at 303. 
147. Id. at 304. 
148. See, e.g., Competent Authorities Warning Taxpayers To Provide More Exten-
sive Documentation, Transfer Pricing (BNA) at 124 (July 3, 1996). 
149. This could allow resolution of double taxation issues prior to deficiencies 
being paid. See U.S.-Japan Process Would Allow Relief For Taxpayers Under Japa-
nese Audit, ACI Says, Transfer Pricing (BNA) at 99 (June 21, 1995). 
150. Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing, supra note 2, at 295. For a discussion of 
APAs in the United States, see supra Section III.B.3 .. 
151. See Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing, supra note 2, at 295. 
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In order for APAs to be feasible internationally, both the 
business entities and the competent authorities of the states 
involved must be able to understand and bridge the taxation 
differences between the respective systems. Japan and the 
United States are both members of the Pacific Association of 
Tax Administrators (hereinafter PATA).152 The PATA has 
taken a number of steps in order to facilitate the handling of 
tax matters between and among the member states. PATA 
members agreed upon expedited exchange of information 
guidelines in order to facilitate tax examinations. 153 PATA 
developed and instituted broad procedural guidelines in order 
to facilitate the competent authority portion of obtaining bilat-
eral AP As. 154 The members have continued coordination of 
their AP A systems in order to better coordinate and handle the 
increasing number of APA applications. 155 
Usage of APAs by multinational business entities has 
increased dramatically in the past ten years, and many multi-
national corporations expect the use of APAs to increase fur-
ther. 156 In fact, the majority of advance pricing agreements 
currently approved by the IRS are bilateral or multilateral 
agreements involving the IRS and the tax authority of one or 
more foreign governments. 157 A number of Japanese firms are 
actively pursuing AP As with the IRS.158 
152. The other members are Australia and Canada. 
153. See Miyatake, supra note 31, at Japan 51. 
154. See Japanese Banks Seeking Bilateral APAs, supra note 31, at 204; see 
also Julianne MacKinnon, IF A's U.S. Branch Considers Recent Worldwide APA 
Development, 9 TAX NOTES INT'L 1815 (Dec. 12, 1994) (indicating that, as of that 
date, the U.S. had reached agreement with Canada, Australia, and Japan). 
155. See Pacific Rim Tax Administrations Discuss Transfer Pricing Issues, 
Transfer Pricing (BNA) at 346 (Oct. 18, 1995); see also Bilateral Advance Pricing 
Agreements, 12 TAX NOTES INT'L 1589 (May 20, 1996) [hereinafter Bilateral Ad-
vance Pricing Agreements] (citing speech of Michael Durst, director of the U.S. 
APA program; noting also total of 125 completed APAs in U.S. as of May, 1996). 
156. In an international study of multinational corporations: 81% expected the 
use of APAs to increase, and almost 50% believed that they would enter into one 
in the future. See Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing, supra note 2, at 295. 
157. As of May, 1996, 80% of the 125 APAs were bilateral or multilateral, an 
increased ratio over 50% in August, 1994. See Bilateral Advance Pricing Agree-
ments, supra note 154, at 1589. 
158. See, e.g., Pre-Confirmation System To Be Made Law, supra note 110, at 94 
(practitioners estimate that, as of June, 1996, about 20 large Japanese taxpayers 
have requested U.S. APAs); see also Hitachi Expected To Receive U.S. APA, Com-
pany, Japanese Tax Sources Say, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 99, at G-2-G-3 (May 
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There are several major issues with the use of AP As from 
a business point of view. One of the major drawbacks to APAs, 
as seen by both U.S. businesses and businesses of other coun-
tries, is the requirement of disclosure of sensitive informa-
tion. 159 Another major drawback consists of the time and cost 
involved in preparing an international APA. 
Apple Computer was the first multinational corporation to 
enter into an advance pricing agreement regarding transfer 
pricing with the tax authorities of two jurisdictions, the United 
States and Australia. 160 To date, Apple Computer, Inc. has 
used advance pricing agreements with several of its foreign 
subsidiaries, including Australia, Canada, Singapore, as well 
as the first by a U.S. parent company between the IRS and 
Japan's National Taxation Authority. The total cost of Apple's 
Australian APA was approximately $200,000. 161 Although ex-
perience and data accumulated should reduce the costs of an 
APA, each will require significant tailored research; prepara-
tion of Apple's AP A included examination of pricing arrange-
ments between Apple and Apple Japan, comparable transac-
tions, and entities. 
For the future, the United States and Japan are working 
together not only to reduce the costs involved in the prepara-
tion of APAs, but also to encourage and facilitate the usage of 
AP As. One milestone in easing the difficulty caused by the 
different transfer pricing approaches occurred recently when 
the NTA and the IRS granted an advance pricing agreement to 
Komatsu, a Japanese firm with a U.S. unit, based on a hybrid 
of the transfer pricing methodologies preferred by each. 162 
22, 1996). Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Fuji Bank Ltd., and Sumitomo Bank 
Ltd. of Osaka have obtained U.S. APAs. See Japanese Banks Seeking Bilateral 
APAs, supra note 31, at 204. 
159. In a survey of 210 multinational corporations representing 11% of the 
Global 1000, this was found to be the major disadvantage of APAs from their 
perspective. For this study of multinational corporations and their usage, concerns, 
and beliefs regarding APAs, see Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing, supra note 2, at 
297. 
160. This agreement took place before the advent of the U.S.' formal program 
for APAs. See id. at 294. 
161. Internal time was estimated at about 1200 hours total. External 
consultants' fees were $50,000 to $150,000 for each original submission. As of 
1994, Apple's IRS User Fees were $10,000. See id. at 310. 
162. The two methodologies are the comparable price method preferred by the 
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C. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOP-
MENT (OECD) 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment has been involved in the issue of taxation and reconciling 
tax issues between states. In 1977, the OECD issued a model 
treaty as an international standard for income tax treaty nego-
tiations. 163 The members of the OECD took an early and firm 
stance on transfer pricing, declaring that: "[e]nterprises should 
refrain from making use of the particular facilities available to 
them, such as transfer pricing which does not conform to an 
arm's length standard, for modifying in ways contrary to na-
tional laws the tax base on which members of the group are 
assessed."I64 
In 1979, the OECD produced transfer pricing guidelines, 
which are being revised to reflect current developments in 
transfer pricing and to serve as guidelines in the international 
tax arena. 16S A representative of the U.S. Treasury noted that 
it "is difficult to over-emphasize the importance of these guide-
lines," describing them as "the consensus interpretation of the 
arm's length standard," and noting their usage and acceptance 
IRS and the profit split method used by NTA. See U.S.·Japan Tax Authorities 
Agree to First 'Hybrid' Methodology APA For Japanese Firm, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) 
No. 95, at G-1 (May 16, 1996). 
163. See Donald A. Finlayson, U.S. Source Income Earned by Foreign Branches 
and Affiliates, 47 TAX LAw. 349, 362 (1994); see also Model Tax Convention on 
Income, supra note 100. The OECD Model was revised in 1992 and again in 1995. 
164. Declaration by the Governments of DECO Member Countries and Decisions 
of the DECD Council on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, 
June 21, 1976, Annex-Taxation (2), as amended in 1979 and 1984, DECO, INTER-
NATIONAL INVESTMENT (rev. ed. 1984) reprinted in 2 BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INTER-
NATIONAL ECONOMIC LAw 565, 570 (American Society of Int'l Law ed., Commerce 
Clearing House 1990). 
165. See Samuels, supra note 28, at 64. For some of the diverse views of the 
DECO Transfer Pricing Guidelines from different national perspectives, see, e.g., 
Toshiaki Katsushima, Perspective: DECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6-7 INTERTAX 
273 (1995); AsSOCIATION OF GERMAN CHAMBERS OF INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE FED-
ERATION OF GERMAN INDUSTRIES, Comments on DECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 
Part I-Discussion. Draft, 2 INTERTAX 93 (1995); FEDERATION DES EXPERTS 
COMPI'ABLES EUROPEENS (Press Release), FEE Comments on Discussion Draft of 
Part I of the DECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2 INTERTAX 104 (1995); ICC Com· 
ments on DECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for MNEs and Tax Administrations -
Discussion Draft of Part I, 1 INTERTAX 39 (1995). 
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in U.S. bilateral tax discussions. 166 Experts in the area of tax-
ation and transfer pricing agree that "there will be a greater 
role for organizations like the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development than organizations based In one 
country such as the IRS of the United States."167 
Internationally accepted standards for transfer pricing will 
promote the efficiency and effectiveness of transfer pricing 
regulation and negotiations by and between states. 168 For ex-
ample, the United States and Japan are moving toward a clos-
er consensus based not only on their bilateral negotiations, but 
also on their mutual involvement in the OECD. The IRS and 
the U.S. Treasury worked with the OECD to ensure that the 
OEeD interpretation of the arm's length standard and the 
I.R.S. Regulations interpretation are consistent. 169 In fact, the 
U.S. Treasury's position is that "there is no substantial differ-
ence between the U.S. and the OECD guidelines.,,17o The Jap-
anese transfer pricing regime, as discussed above, was orig-
inally based on the OECD work. The serious involvement of a 
number of states in the development and extension of the 
OECD model for transfer pricing, although fraught with a 
certain level of disagreement, clarifies, if not international 
guidelines, at least areas of disagreement. 
V. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO BE CONSIDERED 
A. FORMULARY APPORTIONMENT 
While there are variations on the formula used, the most 
basic formula approach to taxation compares property, payroll, 
166. See Samuels, supra note 28, at 65. 
167. See O'Connor, supra note 6, at iv. 
168. This is indicated by the amount of time spent by and between states inter-
preting and negotiating differences in tax policies and accounting principles. These 
negotiations are not only time-consuming, but also not always successful. Differenc-
es in the tax policies and customary practices of Japan and the U.S. and the 
resulting differences in interpretation of pricing and costs are cited as the predom-
inant factors in competent authority negotiations between the U.S. and Japan in 
the last decade. See Some 20 Cases in U.S.-Japan Negotiations But Several At 
Stalemate, Sources Say, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at G-l (Feb. 21, 1995). 
169. See Birnkrant & Croker, Jr., supra note 15, at 268. 
170. See Bilateral Advance Pricing Agreements, supra note 154, at 1589 (quoting 
Michael Durst, director of the AFA program). 
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and sales in each country where a business operates. One 
suggestion for formulary apportionment is worldwide unitary 
apportionment based on the California model. 171 The states of 
the U.S. use formulary apportionment to allocate income 
earned by multistate businesses between the states. 172 The 
formulary approach determines the overall worldwide profits of 
an entity and allocates it to countries based on a mathematical 
formula. 173 
This method has been considered as a solution by many 
authors and is being studied by officials in the United 
States,174 although not supported by many involved in trans-
fer pricing, including members of the Treasury.175 California's 
worldwide unitary apportioning method was upheld by the 
U.S. Supreme Court which held that it was "fairly apportioned, 
nondiscriminatory, fairly related to the services provided by 
the State, and that its imposition did not result inevitably in 
multiple taxation."176 
Worldwide unitary apportioning is advocated on the theory 
that it is a more effective means for taxing multinational cor-
porations which are inherently interdependent. 177 A benefit of 
the unitary system to taxpayers is non-interference with trans-
fer pricing or financial decisions of the taxpayers. 178 In order 
for worldwide unitary apportioning to be successfully imple-
mented, wide-scale support and change would be essential. 179 
171. See Tyson, supra note 126, at 35. 
172. Michael S. Schadewald, Global Apportionment: How Would It Affect the 
Largest U.S. Corporations?, 12 TAX NOTES INT'L 131 (July 8, 1996). 
173. For examples and explanations of how variations impact the outcome, see 
id. at 135-137; see also Multinationals Concerned About Treasury Conducting Study 
for Dorgan, 159 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Aug. 17, 1995, at G-3 [hereinafter Multina-
tionals Concerned About Tr..easury Conducting Study]. 
174. The General Accounting Office issued a report on the possibilities of using 
a formulary system for the United States at a national level, and the Treasury 
Department is also preparing its own study. See e.g., Multinationals Concerned 
About Treasury Conducting Study, supra note 172, at G-3; see also Schadewald, 
supra note 171, at 131 (presents a study representing the differences in taxable 
U.S. profits for 1994 of 50 of the largest U.S. corporations using the formulary 
method versus arm's length transfer pricing). 
175. See, e.g., Samuels, supra note 28, at 67. 
176. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S: Ct. 2268, 2278 (1994). 
177. See Tyson, supra note 126, at 47. 
178. See id. at 51. 
179. See id. at 48; see also Samuels, supra note 28, at 67_ 
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Formulary apportionment is opposed by many multination-
als as causing double taxation of foreign earned income ISO 
and creating additional compliance and administrative bur-
dens. lsl It is also strongly opposed by the DEeD draft report 
on Transfer Pricing as difficult to implement due to the need 
for consensus as to a formula and the numerous accounting 
factors used therein. lB2 
Any formula approach to analyzing pricing, by its nature, 
neglects to consider reasons other than tax manipulation for 
non-arm's length prices between related entities. lB3 A fair ex-
amination to determine the existence of abusive transfer would 
require examining a number of other potential reasons for 
differential pricing practices. These include a number of gener-
al business reasons, such as market penetration, associated 
products, and valued long-term business relationships, among 
others. A number of cultural reasons could also account for dif-
ferential pricing policies between parties which are related, 
including, among others: family ties, tradition, valued long-
term relationships, and supporting the business efforts of an 
economically less competitive entity due to affiliation, relation-
ship, or friendship. The formulary approach does not always 
allocate taxation consistent with reality or fairness. 
The fundamental difference between arm's length method 
and formula method is that the former must be determined for 
each operation, whereas the formula method uses the 
taxpayer's average internal rate of return on its worldwide 
180. See, e.g., Multinationals Concerned About Treasury Conducting Study, supra 
note 172, at G-3 (quoting Dave Jory, tax attorney for Citicorp as saying that Citi-
corp opposes formulary apportionment as it "would virtually guarantee double 
taxation of our income earned abroad."). 
181. See, e.g., id. at G-3 (quoting Alex Spitzer, senior vice president of taxes at 
Nestle). 
182. See Samuels, supra note 28, at 67 (positing that, due to the extent of the 
differences and definitions to be reconciled, a Multinational Tax Commission of 
some form would be required, with concordant delegation of some domestic tax 
policy). 
183. See Lodin, supra note 27, at 240 (discussing the United States' 1992 pro-
posed regulations, Sven-Olof Lodin, a professor and policy advisor to Swedish in-
dustry, comments that the proposed regulations "represent an endeavor for fiscal 
perfectionism, which seems to forget that transfer prices are generally based on 
business purposes and not the avoidance of US taxes.") 
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operations. l84 Several specific business factors which can 
cause the results of formulary apportionment to differ greatly 
from an arm's length analysis include: varying exchange 
rates,185 differences between the products and services pro-
duced and sold in various countries, labor costs, customer pref-
erences, local economic conditions, and other location-specific 
factors. 186 
B. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION SYSTEM 
One possible solution to facilitate the effective and efficient 
administration of taxation of international transactions would 
be to implement an international taxation system. The interna-
tional community has long recognized that the governance of 
multinational business requires at least multinational agree-
ment, if not a multinational governing body or bodies. Issues of 
sovereignty sometimes impede the multinational/multilateral 
regulation of business practice, but pragmatism and growing 
international interdependence encourage and require the con-
tinued development and application of international private 
law to multinational business activities. However, taxation is 
still considered a sovereignty issue which may allow for bilat-
eral or multinational discussion, but remains a decision of each 
nation. 
One theory is that: "[T]he Nation State has become an 
unnatural, even dysfunctional, unit for organizing human 
activity and managing economic endeavor in a borderless 
world ... it overlooks the true linkages and synergies that 
exist among often disparate populations by combining impor-
tant measures of human activity at the wrong level of analy-
sis."187 Although the role of international law continues to 
grow in the world community and plays an increasing role 
within nations, tension remains between a nation's desire for 
sovereignty and the facilitation provided by international law. 
184. See Schadewald, supra note 171, at 132. 
185. See Tyson, supra note 126, at 43. 
186. See Schadewald, supra note 171, at 137-138. 
187. Kenichi Ohmae, The Rise of the Region State, 72 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 78 
(1993) (arguing that the economy is undeniably global in nature, made up of re-
gions and states sharing certain economic and consumer interests). 
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However, the trend, particularly in the second half of the twen-
tieth century, has been for countries to forsake an increasing 
amount of sovereignty for international development and sta-
bility. International law is developing increased presence and 
importance in many realms of life, including, among others: 
human rights, peace and war, maritime activities, environ-
ment, politics, developmental issues, and, due to its enormous 
impacts on the world community and across state boundaries, 
international business. 188 
Although the harmonization of effective corporate rates 
among nations would preclude the use of corporate income 
taxation as a national policy tool,189 hopefully, the growing 
body of bilateral treaties, multilateral guidelines, agreements, 
and conventions on the subject of transfer pricing embodies 
growing consensus within the international community. The 
rapid development of international standards, conventions, 
understandings, and practices regarding transfer pricing could 
arguably be construed as international law, although it has not 
been recognized as such. Outside of taxation, nations, business 
entities, and individuals are increasingly required to be famil-
iar with and respect international private law as it applies to 
multinational business interests and the entities which devel-
op, interpret, and apply it. In order to truly address the issue 
of appropriate taxation in the face of transfer pricing, nations 
and the international community as a whole must reach agree-
mentes) as to the purpose of this taxation and design taxation 
process(es) to accomplish the purpose(s). 
The possible advantages of an international tax system are 
many. A tax with a single form for the international tax ad-
ministration would require the taxpayer to comply with one set 
of document and information requests. Additionally, compli-
ance with a single set of rules would be easier to figure out 
without the juggling necessary to maintain consistency with 
several regimes simultaneously. 
188. For a discussion of the rapidly increasing body and importance of inter-
national trade law as it intersects with American trade law, and the resulting 
gaps and difficulties, see generally Garten, supra note 20, at 15. 
189. See Tyson, supra note 126, at 49. 
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An international tax administration should prove not only 
less costly, but also much easier from a state governmental 
point of view. The international tax administration could han-
dle apportionment of funds. An impartial international body 
could not only be neutral, but also reduce costs by its neutrali-
ty and result in fairer results for poorer nations by providing 
them with a certain sum of income, which they may not have 
the administration or the might to collect on their own. 
C. FLAT TAX 
The use of a flat (or uniform rate of) tax would not address 
the individual nature of each transaction, but, in not doing so, 
it would eliminate a phenomenal amount of administration 
and research costs for both the taxpayers and the tax adminis-
trations involved. There is a desire to use precedent in order to 
be just and to facilitate the development of a body of transfer 
pricing law. However, in the area of taxation, there are not 
only issues of confidentiality and proprietary information, 190 
but also the fact that each case is truly unique. 
A flat tax would ease the difficulty of compliance with 
transfer pricing regulations, which is incredibly burdensome 
for tax administrative bodies and for taxpayers. 191 The major 
cost component and area of disagreement in resolving transfer 
pricing issues are the determinations of the existence and 
extent of abusive transfer pricing. The determination of proper 
pricing is by its definition very complex;192 an accurate analy-
sis of pricing requires an understanding of: the industry; the 
relationships; the competitors; fluctuations and developments 
in, and history of the market; an understanding of the relation-
ships and goals involved in a set of transactions; and the abili-
ty to accurately discern the profit margin. The determination 
190. In a survey of 210 multinational corporations representing 11% of the 
Global 1000, this was found to be the major disadvantage of APAs from their 
perspective. See Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing, supra note 2, at 307. 
191. Cf Wolosoff, supra note 38, at 706; see also Taxpayers Should Not Rush 
into Studies for §6662 Purposes, supra note 58, at 111 (quoting Alan O. Dixler, 
Merck & Co.'s senior tax counsel, as stating that transfer pricing compliance can 
be summed up by the acronym SARA: "shock, anger, rejection, and acceptance."). 
192. For a succinct entertaining criticism of transfer pricing methodologies, see 
O'Connor, supra note 6, at ix-xi. 
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of profit itself is complex and allows for such an array of differ-
ent results that profit is a nebulous basis for payment in a con-
tract situation and certainly in a taxation system. The determi-
nation of whether or not parties are related is time-consuming 
and often impossible to determine with accuracy.193 The time 
involved in researching transfer pricing for intangibles is phe-
nomenal and usually ends up being based on subjective com-
parisons and analyses. 194 
The problems with trying to state every possible issue is 
seen by the proliferation of the regulations, treaties, conven-
tions, and administrative bodies with little resulting clarity. 
This issue is likely to become exacerbated as an increasing 
number of smaller companies have access to and participate in 
international markets and face possible transfer pricing is-
sues.195 A flat tax would eliminate the enormous, increasing 
amount of time, staff, and money required of taxpayers and tax 
administrations in order to handle transfer pricing issues196 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A systemic analysis of taxation of entities involved in in-
ternational business requires examining stakeholders in the 
global marketplace as a whole, the goals of each, the current 
structures, systems and processes in place, and how these do 
193. Apple Computer Completes Bilateral U.S.-Japanese APA, Daily Tax Rep. 
(BNA) No. 164, at G-2 (Aug. 24, 1995). 
194. The OECD report notes that establishing comparables for determining 
arm's length pricing for intangibles must include a careful consideration of several 
factors which affect comparability: the potential profits from use of intangible prop-
erty, any geographical limitations on usage, any restrictions on exportations of 
goods, exclusivity of the rights transferred, and whether the licensee has rights to 
the licensor's further developments of the intangible property. See Marc M. Levey 
& Lawrence W. Shapiro, DECD Transfer Pricing Draft Targets Excessive Documen-
tation, 6 J. INT'L TAX'N 244, 245 (1995). 
195. The temporary § 482 regulations addressed the issue of a small business 
safe harbor, based on computing transfer prices according to profit level indicators 
to be published by the Service. The final regulations did not include a safe harbor 
due to concerns by the Service and foreign treaty partners that the safe harbors 
might be misapplied or result in inaccurate reporting of income. See Hirsh et aI., 
supra note 33, at 593. 
196. TAX POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION ISSUES, supra, note 4, at L-1 (estimating 
that IRS examiners, economists, and appeals staff spent about 186 staff years on 
cases related to transfer pricing closed in fiscal 1993 and about 227 staff years on 
those closed in fiscal year 1992). 
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or do not interact and function. Theoretically, the goal of taxa-
tion is that the total tax paid by each entity represents a fair 
and reasonable contribution of a portion of income towards the 
maintenance of the system or a part thereof. In an ideal sys-
tem, there would be an equitable distribution of tax between 
jurisdictions. A well-designed tax system would motivate in-
vestment and development that would support international 
goals regarding development, the environment, and society, to 
name a few. 
The inherent weaknesses of tax models and model struc-
tures in general are their single dimensionality and inadequate 
feedback. Like most models, tax models do not take adequate 
cognizance of evolution within a system. The structure of a 
model is often unable to adjust for changes in the external 
environment. 
As the cost to the state of getting the revenue is exorbitant 
and becoming more so, while the efficacy of doing so is limited, 
other less cumbersome solutions should be and are being ex-
plored. Aside from the jurisdictional issues causing overlapping 
taxation, the body of tax law and regulations designed by na-
tions to tax "their share"197 of international transactions is 
complex, overwhelmingly detailed, cumbersome, expensive, 
confusing, and time-consuming to apply. The tax administra-
tions must design rules and mechanisms to analyze and verify 
the reality of pricing strategies between entities, which mayor 
may not be designed to minimize or eliminate taxation. Also, 
nations must resolve whether and how to work with other 
nations to resolve, reconcile, or compromise on administering 
and resolving issues of double taxation. 
In a perfect solution, income would only be taxed once by 
the jurisdiction where that income is being produced; however, 
the location of income generation is often ambiguous and diffi-
cult to ascertain with certainty. Additionally, the determina-
tion of whether the transfer price actually reflects the income 
generated is more difficult to assess than is immediately ap-
197. The national tax authorities represent the interests of their own nations 
and the interpretations and applications of transfer pricing regulations which will 
benefit their nations. See Lodin, supra note 27, at 240. 
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parent. In assessing pricing between related entities, many 
countries look to comparable transactions; but, is the "real 
price" what another entity would charge an unrelated entity? 
Pricing is done for tax reasons, but also for other reasons, 
including: growth strategy, capturing a market, introduction of 
a product/service, capturing other related markets (e.g. cellular 
telephones for $1), and the creation of future consumers. 
It would seem logical that to eliminate transfer pricing 
issues, either the tax to be assessed must be based on "non-
fudge able criteria" or taxation should be by one entity interna-
tionally, with an effective and equitable distribution to the 
specific nations. The plethora of codes, regulations, rules, and 
administrators indicates the difficulty of doing so under the 
arm's length standard now applied. Given that it is currently 
estimated that almost half of all trade among the more devel-
oped nations takes place between related parties,198 ascer-
taining a true arm's length price may be difficult or impossible. 
However, one U.S. Treasury official sums up the debate as to 
international transfer pricing methodologies: "[T]he primary 
advantage that the arm's length standard currently enjoys in 
relation to formulary apportionment is the simple fact that 
most of the world agrees that it should be the international 
norm.,,199 
In the international realm, since trade has been seen to 
require multilateral treaties, then why not taxes? From the 
point of view of the taxpaying business entities, some certainty 
or confidence as to tax treatment would help in their short-
and long-term strategic and financial planning. Yet, the ad-
ministration and collection of tax revenue where transfer pric-
ing is involved are far from consistent. From a state point of 
view they are far from successful, and the role of tax policy as 
a force for development or change has been lost. Even if taxa-
tion was done on an international level or according to some 
harmonized taxation scheme, tax could be used to encourage 
domestic or international policies through means other than 
the amount assessed, such as rebates or industry specific ap-
plication of revenues. However, the key problem with the cur-
198. See Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing, supra note 2, at 299. 
199. See Samuels, supra note 28, at 68. 
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rent state of transfer pricing regulation as epitiomized by the 
American approach is that it pays little or no attention to the 
fact that the transfer pricing problems are general internation-
al problems affecting many countries and that this must be 
taken into account when formulating the rules.20o 
200. Lodin, supra note 27, at 240. 
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